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The crowdfunding phenomenon has entered the world stage with the 
advent of lending-based crowdfunding in the mid-2000s as two new 
platforms emerged from both sides of the Atlantic. Zopa was established 
in the UK in 2005, and briefly afterwards Prosper was established in the 
United States in 2006. Both broke grounds by mediating between private 
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lenders and borrowers via dedicated websites, which bypassed traditional 
financial institutions while benefiting from fees on successful transactions 
(Bachmann et al. 2011).
The new phenomenon was labelled as Peer-to-Peer (hereafter ‘P2P’) 
Lending. Since its emergence, P2P lending has offered good returns to 
investors and lower cost of capital to borrowers (Hollas 2013). Such 
model allowed borrowers to receive a loan without a financial institu-
tion involvement and a possibility of receiving better conditions than 
those offered by traditional credit providers (Bachmann et  al. 2011). 
For lenders, the new model presented a new investment and portfolio 
diversification opportunities, where risk was coupled with credit ratings 
of loans, and which offered better returns than some of the existing 
products (ibid.).
The phenomenon received a further push following the global financial 
crisis as a consequence of the drying up of traditional financing (Bruton 
et al. 2015). Such development was part of a wider Financial Technology 
(FinTech) industry development in which technological changes enabled 
new practices and business models disrupting traditional financial services 
while building on a degree of user distrust towards traditional institutions 
following the financial crisis (Haddad and Hornuf 2019). Furthermore, 
alternative finance models carried the potential to unlock access to finance 
for individual and business borrowers who might have previously been 
excluded or marginalised by traditional lending practices (Serrano-Cinca 
et  al. 2015). For both borrowers and investors, the crowdlending space 
offers unprecedented access, as the barrier to entry is often low, with some 
platforms offering a minimum investment as little as $1, while the mini-
mum and maximum loan amounts on platforms range from a few dollars, 
to several million dollars. Hence, overall, crowdlending can offer more 
diverse sources of funding for the real economy in countries that have previ-
ously over-relied on bank lending for growth.
During the last decade, the industry has seen a proliferation of debt- 
based crowdfunding models from P2P lending to Balance Sheet lending, 
Invoice Trading, and Debt-based Securities, jointly referred to from now 
onwards as ‘Crowdlending’. Such models have dominated the crowd-
funding industry throughout its brief history, with crowdlending almost 
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doubling in size every year. In 2018, crowdlending models accounted 
for 97% of the USD 300 billion global crowdfunding industry, while 
exhibiting an average year-on-year growth rate of 93% since 2014 
(Ziegler et al. 2020).
Unsurprisingly, in light of this impressive growth, and thanks to its 
related efficiency gains, some began suggesting that crowdlending repre-
sents a real challenge to traditional finance (Hollas 2013; Kotarba 2016). 
However, others suggest that FinTech solutions may both complement 
existing financing channels as well as fill market needs from which tradi-
tional institutions have withdrawn (Haddad and Hornuf 2019). 
Indeed, recent empirical evidence clearly shows that traditional financial 
institutions actively participate in crowdlending and represent an impor-
tant portion of related volumes (Ziegler et al. 2020).
In this chapter we review the current state of crowdlending. First, we 
present important milestones in its brief history followed by a detailed 
classification of the crowdlending model types that have emerged in this 
period. Next, we present facts and figures reflecting the current state of 
crowdlending both at global and regional levels. This is followed by a 
brief review of the mechanisms underlying crowdlending platform opera-
tions, supported by insights from current knowledge and existing 
research. Our chapter then concludes with suggestions for future research, 
as well as some implications for practice.
 A Brief History of Crowd Lending
Crowdlending originated from the emergence of P2P Lending with the 
launching of ZOPA (Bachmann et al. 2011). Being the first P2P lending 
platform, ZOPA began its operation in 2005, while originating personal 
loans to British consumers through funds provided by retail investors. In 
this respect, individual investors would be matched to borrowers as 
related to their own lending criteria and appetite, bypassing conventional 
lending processes. Nearly 15 years on, Zopa was set to become the first 
‘Unicorn’ of the Digital Lending era (Armstrong 2018).
Within a year, the US-based platform Prosper was launched and closely 
followed up by Lending Club, both focusing on the consumer lending 
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market as well as on refinancing of student loans. P2P lending activities in 
the United States have some critical contextual differences that should be 
highlighted. The first relates to how the industry self-identifies. In the 
United States, firms have broadly adopted the moniker of ‘marketplace’ 
instead of ‘peer-to-peer’ largely to reflect the difference of stakeholders that 
utilise their services. The United States tends to rely heavily on sale of full 
or partial loans to institutional or professional investors, rather than focus-
ing on matching retail individuals to borrowers (Milne and Parboteeah 
2016). In this respect, the firms act more in a syndicate manner, creating a 
mechanism for matching loan-notes to interested investors.
As this marketplace began to grow quickly within the United States, 
concerns over how to best regulate it also emerged. By 2008, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of the United States began to require P2P 
Lending firms (marketplace lenders) to register the loans executed on 
their platform as a security (Barry 2019). Specifically, investors would be 
purchasing non-recourse notes representing fractional interests in specific 
underlying consumer loans (Popescu 2016). Though this was the first 
example of regulating the P2P Lending industry, regulation of alternative 
finance activities in the United States is arguably still in flux. Notably, the 
JOBS Act was not signed into law until 2012, with a slow roll-out of 
legislation and regulatory guidance that persists in the United States as 
of today.
By 2010, examples of P2P Lending FinTech firms began to emerge 
worldwide, with some of the first examples of P2P lending focused on the 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (hereafter ‘SME’) or Business bor-
rower space. Since their launch in 2010, Funding Circle became one of 
the first FinTech firms to apply the P2P lending model specifically to 
business loans (Milne and Parboteeah 2016). Though the consumer lend-
ing model remains the single largest iteration of P2P Lending, the asset 
class has expanded significantly, with firms now offering business loans, 
property loans, mortgages, and an array of other debt-facilities.
In 2011, the first P2P Lending-focused trade-body emerged in the 
form of the UK’s “Peer-to-Peer Finance Association”. Though this trade- 
body has since ceased its activities, its emergence came at a critical point 
for the advancement of the landscape in the UK (Nixon 2020). This 
association implemented a code of conduct, effectively creating rules for 
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‘self-regulation’ in advance of formal regulation of the industry. By 2013, 
the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority launched its first consultation on 
Crowdfunding, which included digital lending activities referred to as 
‘loan-based crowdfunding’. Since 2014, the P2P lending market in the 
UK has fallen under the remit of the FCA. By 2016, examples of pro-
posed or existing regulation of P2P/Marketplace activities was apparent 
globally.
By the end of the decade, crowdlending has become a global and main-
stream activity, with platforms operating in nearly every country in the 
world. However, nowhere as prominently as in China, which grew to be 
the world’s largest crowdlending market, estimated at USD 356 billion in 
2017 (Ziegler et al. 2018). More specifically, China presents an interest-
ing evolution path in a unique context characterized by relatively unde-
veloped regulatory environment, where loans are riskier than in the 
United States or the United Kingdom, the credit referencing system is 
not fully developed, and where loans are financed primarily by house-
holds (Milne and Parboteeah 2016).
However, recent years have seen growing concerns with fraud in the 
Chinese crowdlending space, especially following the collapse of plat-
forms such as Ezubao, which was found to be operating as a “Ponzy 
scheme” (Zhang and Miller 2017). Late in 2016, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission issued interim rules for regulating the P2P lend-
ing industry, in an effort to limit credit risk (Chorzempa 2018). This was 
necessary to address problems where Chinese platforms were acting more 
like deposit takers with creation of a ‘capital pool’, with retail investors 
effectively lending to the platform rather than funding specific loans or 
loan-parts intermediated by the platforms, as elsewhere. This crackdown 
has led to a course correction, with the Chinese crowdlending market 
seeing a 34% decline in market volume between 2017 and 2018 (Ziegler 
et al. 2020). Following regulatory crackdown and the exit of platforms 
suspected of questionable practices, it is expected that the market may 
gradually recover in the future, but it remains unclear how quickly and to 
what extent such recovery will occur. Despite this decline, China remains 
the largest crowdlending market in the world with a volume of close to 
USD 215 billion in 2018 (ibid.).
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 A Continually Evolving Classification 
of Models
While the concept of private individuals lending money without mediation is 
not new or revolutionary, what makes crowdlending a new phenomenon 
is the conduct of such transactions over the Internet while using online 
platforms (Bachmann et  al. 2011). Most importantly, these are non-
deposit taking platforms that facilitate online credit (through either 
secured or unsecured loans) to individuals or business borrowers, with 
capital lent by individuals or institutional investors. These platforms, and 
the models they represent, have evolved as a response to the gaps in the 
traditional credit market dominated by banks, and live outside of the 
incumbent or traditional debt ecosystem.
Crowdlending, also referred to as ‘FinTech Credit’, can be defined as 
all credit activity facilitated by platforms that match borrowers with lend-
ers (investors) and includes activities referred to as “P2P lending”, “loan- 
based crowdfunding” or “marketplace lending” and also may include 
platforms that use their own balance sheet to intermediate between bor-
rowers and lenders (Bank for International Settlements and Financial 
Stability Board 2017).
This chapter will adopt the classification used and developed by the 
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) in its annual industry 
bench-marking reports (e.g. Ziegler et al. 2020). This classification includes a 
variety of alternative finance lending models that fall under the broader scope 
of FinTech Credit. In the text that follows, definitions and terms provided are 
adopted from the CCAF reports, unless stated otherwise.
First, Peer-to-peer (P2P) Lending—is a model in which a group of indi-
vidual or institutional investors provide a loan (secured or unsecured) to 
a consumer or business borrower. In its most orthodox form, the P2P 
lending platform acts as a marketplace that connects the borrower and 
investor(s) such that the risk of financial loss if the loan is not repaid is 
with the investor and not with the platform. Depending upon the juris-
diction, this model may be referred to as Loan-based Crowdfunding, 
Marketplace Lending, or Collaborative Financing.
The mechanics, as graphically presented in Fig. 4.1, are as follows. The 
P2P lending firm provides potential borrowers with an easily accessible 
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and low-cost loan application, which is processed on an online platform. 
In most cases, the P2P lending firm will rely upon traditional credit scor-
ing facilities and borrower-provided financial information in order to 
assess the borrower’s affordability, loan price, and rating, while verifying 
the information provided within the loan application. Nevertheless, in- 
house methodologies used for platforms’ own loan risk assessment are 
difficult to ascertain, as these are proprietary and disclosure is limited 
(Bank for International Settlements and Financial Stability Board 2017). 
With the advent of Open Banking, APIs to connect to individualized 
financial data is on the rise, but this is largely occurring within the con-
straints of the European Union.
In the early days of P2P lending, investors would review individual 
loan applications and make the decision to lend their funds against their 
own assessment. In this respect, the P2P Lending firm would function 
only as an intermediary, executing the loan once self-matched by lenders. 
As the model has developed, it is now far more common for the lending 
platform to automatically match individual lenders against pre-selected 
loan criteria. Regardless, the platform is typically responsible for com-
municating appropriate credit grades, setting a pre-fixed interest rate (a 
shift away from auction models that were more popular at the inception 
















Fig. 4.1 Traditional P2P lending model. (Source: Bank for International 
Settlements and Financial Stability Board (2017). Market structure, business mod-
els and financial stability implications Bank for International Settlements. The full 
publication is available on the BIS website free of charge: www.bis.org)


























Fig. 4.2 Balance sheet lending model. (Source: Bank for International Settlements 
and Financial Stability Board (2017). Market structure, business models and finan-
cial stability implications Bank for International Settlements. The full publication 
is available on the BIS website free of charge: www.bis.org)
Second, Balance Sheet Lending—refers to a model in which a digital 
lending platform directly retains consumer or business loans (either 
whole loans or partial loans), using funds from the platform operator’s 
balance sheet. These platforms therefore function as more than just inter-
mediaries, originating and actively funding loans, so the risk of financial 
loss if the loan is not repaid is with the platform operator. In this respect, 
the platform operator looks more like a non-bank credit intermediary 
(Bank for International Settlements and Financial Stability Board 2017). 
The mechanics of this model are described in Fig. 4.2.
While the above represent the largest share of crowdlending volumes, 
as well as the most common practice. Recent years have seen the emer-
gence of additional models such Invoice Trading, Debt-based Securities 
and Mini Bonds. Here, Invoice Trading, one of the fastest growing mod-
els, refers to an online marketplace where businesses can sell partial or 
whole receivables (invoices) at a discount. Individual lenders or institu-
tional investors may serve as the counterparty in the sale transaction, 
again opening a new investment opportunity to a wider public of inves-
tors. This model is of particular importance for SMEs for raising short-
term debt by pre-financing their outstanding invoices through individual 
or institutional investors (Dorfleitner et al. 2017).
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Debt-based Securities are models where individuals or institutional 
funders purchase securities, typically a bond or debenture, at a fixed interest 
rate. And Mini Bonds refer to a model in which individuals or institutions 
purchase securities from companies in the form of an unsecured bond 
which is ‘mini’ because the issue size is much smaller than the minimum 
issue amount needed for a bond issued in institutional capital markets. 
Furthermore, Mini Bonds are not always transferable, either because the 
issue size is too small to provide secondary market liquidity or because 
prospectus exemptions require investors to hold the bond until maturity. 
Other terms can be very similar to traditional corporate bonds, such 
as being subject to early call provisions allowing the issuer to repay prior 
to maturity if its prospects improve.
 Extended Services and Functionalities
As FinTech credit markets mature and the number of players increases, 
extended services and functionalities emerge. One type of such exten-
sions may be identified in the emergence of aggregator platforms, which 
are tools that compile data from a range of platforms to allow borrowers 
to find suitable loan products from several crowdlending platforms in a 
centralised location. Aggregators offer an opportunity for lenders to com-
pare loan products efficiently across platforms and better understand 
their different financing options. Aggregators may also act as brokers and 
potentially receive commission on referred business.
A second type of extension is associated with the establishment of sec-
ondary markets. In response to the largely illiquid nature of loan parts or 
traches held by investors, some platforms (or third-parties) have estab-
lished secondary markets. In crowdlending, a secondary market acts as a 
marketplace that allows lenders to sell their loan parts before the loan 
reaches maturity. Here, the purchaser may be another lender or even the 
platform itself (in balance sheet lending). Loans may be sold at—a dis-
count or premium, or they might be sold at par, assuming the loan is 
amortizing or repaid in accordance with the loan schedule. Where second-
ary markets are highly automated and the platform has discretion to buy 
and sell on behalf of investors, it is common for a standard valuation 
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algorithm to assign values to each loan in real time, so that the platform 
can ensure it is swapping one loan for another of equivalent value. 
However, secondary markets for P2P loans are a relatively new develop-
ment, not all platforms offer secondary markets, and many secondary 
markets are highly illiquid.
 The State of the Crowdlending Market
In the current section we present the most up-to-date market data from 
the 2019 CCAF Global Alternative Finance Report (Ziegler et al. 2020). 
In 2018, the global alternative finance volumes amounted to just over 
$300 billion, 97% of which derived from models that would fall under 
lending activities.
Since starting to track the alternative finance industry, the P2P Consumer 
Lending model has remained the single largest volume driver, accounting for 
66% of all alternative lending volumes. This was followed by P2P Business 
Lending (17%) and Balance Sheet Business Lending (7%). Individual bor-
rowers, or consumers, are the largest group of borrowers as illustrated in 
Fig. 4.3, driving Fintech Credit activities globally. Consumers are individuals, 
typically receiving an unsecured loan. Although loan size varies significantly 
by jurisdiction, individuals tend to borrow between USD $2,500–30,000, 
with annual percentage rates ranging typically between 7% and 20%. 
Borrowers use these loans to consolidate their debt or refinance credit on their 
credit cards; to purchase a vehicle, repay a student loan, pay utility bills or 
wedding expenses, or to cover the costs associated with illness or unexpected 
hardship. More specifically, it should be noted that research conducted by the 
CCAF suggests that borrowers using P2P or Balance Sheet Consumer Lending 
are increasingly seeking loans to support their business (sole-traders, micro- 
business, early stage capital).
Table 4.1 presents the annual development in crowdlending volumes. 
While the industry has experienced a dramatic growth year-on-year since 
2013 (when data was first collected), a notable drop can be observed in 
five of the eight applicable models between 2017 and 2018. This drop 
can be explained by market dynamics in China, while the rest of the 
world has seen continued healthy growth.
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As mentioned earlier, despite China remaining as the global market 
leader in alternative lending, wide-spread closures of P2P and balance 
sheet lending platforms have occurred due to the implementation of 
increasingly strict regulations. Since July 2018, the absolute number of 
firms, as well as the trading volume of China’s P2P lending platforms, 
have shown a continuing downward trend month by month. According 
Table 4.1 Global alternative lending in USD billion (inclusive of China figures)
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
P2P Consumer Lending $195.29 $243.80 $157.60 $73.09 $21.78 $6.62
P2P Business Lending $50.33 $103.59 $61.59 $43.70 $10.50 $2.20
Balance Sheet Business 
Lending
$21.08 $16.02 $33.99 $2.97 $1.30 $0.51
Balance Sheet Property 
Lending
$11.02 $1.19 $0.57 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Balance Sheet 
Consumer Lending
$9.78 $31.17 $12.43 $3.21 $0.72 $0.09
P2P Property Lending $5.73 $9.14 $11.40 $7.12 $1.62 $0.26
Invoice Trading $3.22 $7.68 $3.38 $2.20 $0.75 $0.18







P2P Consumer Lending P2P Business Lending P2P Property Lending
Balance Sheet Consumer Lending Balance Sheet Business Lending Balance Sheet Property Lending
Invoice Trading Debt-based Securities
Fig. 4.3 Proportion of global volume from key crowdlending models
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to the data from WDZJ (P2P online loan industry portal in China), as of 
November 30, 2019, the number of operating marketplace lending 
platforms in China was 456, a decrease of 87.24% compared to 3574 
(historical peaks) in December 2015; the monthly trading volume in 
November 2019 dropped to 50.623 billion, having fallen by almost 80% 
compared to its peak in 2017.
When we remove China from the alternative finance equation 
(Table 4.2), we see considerable annual growth across seven of the eight 
applicable alternative finance models. As expected, P2P Consumer 
Lending is the largest model even when China’s activity is removed, and 
we note a 66% annual growth from $19.3 billion in 2017 to $31.99 bil-
lion in 2018. Balance Sheet Business Lending ($14.95  billion) and 
Balance Sheet Property Lending ($11.02 billion) became the second and 
third largest models, respectively. 2018 was marked by considerable rapid 
growth of balance sheet models, though it is important to note that more 
than half of the FinTech firms operated according to the P2P lending 
model as well. This suggests that there is increasing emphasis on firms to 
take on origination risk, moving away from exclusively matching models.
 Regional Variances
Regional volumes of crowdlending are summarized in Table 4.3. When 
we consider where crowdlending activities are geographically concen-
trated (while excluding China), the United States (cumulative lending 
Table 4.2 Global alternative lending in USD billion (exclusive of China figures)
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
P2P Consumer Lending $31.99 $19.30 $24.40 $27.77 $9.44 $3.49
Balance Sheet Business 
Lending
$14.95 $8.14 $6.71 $2.40 $1.16 $0.50
Balance Sheet Property 
Lending
$11.02 $1.19 $0.57 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Balance Sheet Consumer 
Lending
$9.40 $15.34 $3.05 $3.09 $0.69 $0.09
P2P Business Lending $7.59 $5.27 $4.93 $4.60 $2.46 $0.77
P2P Property Lending $3.88 $3.20 $4.36 $1.56 $0.14 $0.02
Invoice Trading $2.53 $2.07 $1.10 $0.74 $0.48 $0.15
Debt-based Securities $0.84 $0.22 $0.22 $0.03 $0.02 $0.01


























































































































































































































































































































































































4 Lending Crowdfunding: Principles and Market Development 
76
$57.7 billion) ranks first, followed by the United Kingdom ($9.3 billion), 
the Asia-Pacific ($5.3 billion) and Europe ($6.6 billion). Moreover, if we 
look at the breakdown of lending activity by model type, we see that 
certain regions have greater emphasises on P2P lending activities versus 
balance-sheet lending activities. In Europe and the United Kingdom, for 
instance, there is a greater emphasis on P2P lending models, while in the 
United States and Canada, a greater emphasis is placed on balance sheet 
lending models.
As has been mentioned on a few occasions, the largest volume driving 
model is P2P Consumer Lending. However, it is worth mentioning that 
when we consider lending that was directed to business borrowers, nearly 
$28  billion dollars went to start-ups, SMEs and business entities. 
Interestingly, a large proportion of business borrowers came from P2P 
Consumer Lending platforms, receiving a consumer loan in order to sup-
port their business funding needs.
Businesses, particularly SMEs, are using various Digital Lending prod-
ucts to meet their working or expansion capital needs. To illustrate the 
importance of these channels for SME financing, we provide insights 
from the United Kingdom, which earned a reputation as a leader in P2P 
Business Lending, as well as an environment in which SME finance is 
recorded systematically.
Sources of UK SME Finance are presented in Fig. 4.4. The Bank of 
England estimates that £57.7 billion was lent to SMEs by national banks 
in 2018, which represents a slight increase compared to last year’s figure 
of £57 billion (UK Finance 2018). By comparing the UK P2P Business 
Lending volume against that of the UK Finance annual estimate of new 
loans to SMEs, it has shown that business crowdlending has increased its 
share of total lending steadily from just 0.3% in 2012 to 14.55% in 2018.
Assuming that the vast majority of borrowers in peer-to-peer business 
lending are, in fact, small businesses with an annual turnover of less than 
£2  million, the chart below shows that the volume of P2P Business 
Lending in the United Kingdom is estimated to be equivalent to 34.8% 
of all bank lending to small businesses in 2018, almost 20% increase 
against the previous year. Therefore, P2P Business Lending is becoming 
an increasingly important contributor to overall SME financing in the 
United Kingdom in comparison to bank lending channels.
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Bank Business Lending (BoE) New Loans to SMEs (BBA/UK Finance)
New Loans to Small Businesses (BBA/UK Finance) P2P Business Lending
Fig. 4.4 Sources of UK SME finance 2012–2018 (in billion GBP)
 Risk Assessment in Crowdlending
A fundamental problem underlying crowdlending is that of asymmetrical 
information (Leboeuf and Schwienbacher 2018), especially as it relates to 
mitigating potential risks presented when evaluating potential borrowers. 
Bachmann et  al. (2011) refer to several key determinants that P2P 
Lending firms must evaluate in order to combat principal-agent prob-
lems and provide an overview of the financial characteristics of the bor-
rower as the main indicator of creditworthiness.
Individuals seeking to lend via a P2P lending platform will not always 
have the requisite tools or skill set to comprehensively assess risk. 
Therefore, the platform often conducts an analysis of potential borrow-
ers, assigning appropriate risk bands before offering credit. Whilst indi-
vidual investors must still assess and determine the levels of risk they are 
willing to take, the risks associated with certain borrowers are often deter-
mined by the platform itself.
While in-house methodologies used by platforms for loan risk assess-
ment are difficult to ascertain, as these are proprietary and disclosure is 
limited (Bank for International Settlements and Financial Stability Board 
2017), they usually assess a borrower based on a number of set indicators. 
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Such indicators include the borrower’s existing credit (using traditional 
credit scoring), any capital or collateral that may exist, the capacity to 
repay the loan (debt-to-income ratio), and the conditions which the 
borrower is willing to adhere to. In some cases, platforms may employ an 
alternative underwriting process using algorithmic-based approaches 
to credit scoring and non-traditional data, alongside more traditional 
methods, to determine if the loan is of an acceptable risk level.
When underwriting an SME borrower, the credit assessment require-
ments are usually more robust than in the case of individual borrowing. 
In such cases, a platform will typically restrict lending to firms with less 
than three years of credit history and will require recent filed company 
accounts and information on company management. In some cases, the 
platform may also restrict lending to firms with a certain level of annual 
turnover (for example—requiring more than USD $50,000  in annual 
turnover at minimum). Furthermore, in the case of underwriting a prop-
erty loan, the platform should ideally assess the underlying asset, its loca-
tion and sector, as well as procure independent valuations on the property 
and reassure itself that appropriate permission has been granted for any 
planned development. The platform should also assess the proposed exit 
strategy (sale, refinance etc.) for the property.
 Alternative Credit Analytics
Crowdlending platforms may employ more varied and sophisticated 
credit assessment practices than traditional financiers. FinTech credit 
platforms may access a range of potential borrowers’ data, which may not 
be typically sourced and analysed by banks. However, some ‘mainstream’ 
credit providers are also incorporating alternative credit analytics into the 
credit approval process. The types of data, include location-based infor-
mation, social networking information, hardware data, online shopping 
and other online behaviour, but also more diffused data on educational 
attainment and performance, as well as labour market profile and perfor-
mance (Hale 2019). The lender feeds available data into their algorithm 
to establish creditworthiness. As algorithms are generally proprietary, it is 
difficult to ascertain which data points are used and how they are 
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weighted, when determining a credit rating. As a rule, however, there 
appears to be more evidence of previously excluded borrowers being 
accepted than of previously accepted borrowers being rejected based on 
alternative data (ibid.). In this context, machine learning can also be 
used to analyse data captured during the credit analysis phase. It can also 
be used to gather data on borrowers with a thin credit file.
While most platforms do not yet offer instantaneous, automated credit 
approval, some platforms can provide loan approval and disbursement 
within a few hours (for example, via mobile money). Others are working 
to bring approval times down to a few minutes. Alternative credit analyt-
ics reduces the need for case-by-case manual approval thus increasing the 
efficiency of the loan approval process.
 Pricing
As crowdlending fundamentally occurs online, it reduces operating costs 
for credit intermediaries by removing the need for physical branches 
while allowing heavy (or full) automation of loan application, credit risk 
assessment and pricing processes (Bank for International Settlements and 
Financial Stability Board 2017). They are also not reliant on legacy infra-
structure as banks may be and as a result, pricing will not be impacted by 
normal pricing considerations of traditional bank lenders. In addition, 
platforms may fall outside of certain licensing or other regimes, thus 
reducing regulatory or compliance costs. A study by Autonomous 
Research (2016) found that the ratio of operating expenses to total costs 
was less than 2% for Lending Club, a consumer and business P2P lending 
platform in the United States, and 6% for the largest traditional lenders.
For these reasons FinTech lending platforms may offer lower interest 
rates for borrowers and/or higher returns to investors (Bank for 
International Settlements and Financial Stability Board 2017). Research 
has shown varied outcomes, however, with some studies showing little 
difference in borrower interest rates and investor rate of return given a 
similar risk profile (De Roure et  al. 2016). It is sometimes difficult to 
compare the two rates due to a lack of equivalent loans.
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 Ethical Considerations in Crowdlending
Taking into consideration recent experiences with irresponsible lending 
leading to high levels of personal lending via credit cards (Richards et al. 
2008), which was further exacerbated by the subprime lending upheaval 
(Gilbert 2011), have all left their mark, and were part of the reasons for 
the emergence of alternative crowdlending channels. However, these 
problems were created by individuals who failed in their moral duties 
when making decisions that later led to significant harmful consequences 
from default and bankruptcy and all the way to suicide (Gilbert 2011; 
Richards et al. 2008).
Such moral pitfalls are also relevant for operators of crowdlending plat-
forms, which must strike a delicate balance between business survival and 
growth and the intermediation of responsible lending. Furthermore, at a 
macro level, it remains to be seen to what extent does crowdlending 
reduces or increases long-term indebtedness of borrowers overall, as well 
as its relative burden on their economies. Research on these aspects of 
crowdlending are virtually absent and require further attention due to the 
importance of ethical practice for the well-being of all stakeholders 
involved.
 Loan Defaults & Provision Funds
Some loan defaults are inevitable. Platforms therefore recommend that 
investors diversify their portfolio on-platform to offset some of the nega-
tive effects of default. For example—Funding Circle, a UK-based P2P 
business platform, recommends a minimum investment of £2000 split 
across at least 200 loans (McCorquodale 2018). Platforms can sometimes 
offer provision funds to protect investors from default—a small propor-
tion of monthly loan repayments are placed into a segregated fund. In the 
event of a default, the provision fund may be utilised on a discretionary 
basis to ensure that investor repayment occurs as expected. The level of 
protection and the breadth of coverage depends upon the policy of the 
platform, as well as the characteristics of different loan cohorts.
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While diversification across a large number of borrowers already pro-
vides lenders with substantial protection against default and loss (Milne 
and Parboteeah 2016), defaults do occur. In such cases, platforms attempt 
to extract as much of the value of the loans from the borrower as is pos-
sible within their responsible lending obligations. This involves a combi-
nation of soft interventions as well as legal ones carried out according to 
contract or to insolvency law. For example, the platform may, in acting 
for investors/creditors, appoint an administrator or receiver, and coordi-
nate with other creditors. Or they might enforce against the security 
pledged by the borrower. In practice, recoveries are rarely a core compe-
tence of the platform operator and thus are often outsourced to debt 
collection agencies (Bank for International Settlements and Financial 
Stability Board 2017).
In this context, several academic studies have sought to identify key 
determinants of crowdlending defaults. Here, a study by Serrano-Cinca 
et al. (2015) analysing data from Lending Club, has showed that default 
was associated with borrowers with lower annual income, higher levels of 
indebtedness, shorter credit histories, and loan purpose where small busi-
ness and education exhibiting highest likelihood of default. A different 
study by Lin et  al. (2017) was conducted in the context of a Chinese 
crowdlending platform and showed that higher default rates were 
recorded among men vs. women, younger vs. older, divorced vs. married, 
low vs. highly educated individuals, short vs. long working experience, 
those working for small companies vs. those working for large compa-
nies, those who have high debt to income ration vs. those with low debt 
to income ratio, and those who have a delinquency history vs. those that 
don’t have such history. Furthermore, the higher the amount of monthly 
repayments the higher likelihood of default. Overall, studies suggest that 
platforms capture many of the risks in their assessments, and the credit or 
risk ratings they present are good predictors of default likelihood (Serrano- 
Cinca et al. 2015; Emekter et al. 2015).
In addition, an interesting insight has been highlighted in a study by 
Ge et  al. (2017), which tapped into the unique context of Chinese 
crowdlending, where social media is tightly intertwined with platform 
profiles. Their analysis found a significant decrease in loan default rate 
and increase in default repayment probability, when such information 
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was shared by the platform on the borrower’s social media accounts. This 
indicates that borrowers are deterred by potential social stigma, and that 
social information can be used both for credit scoring and default reduction 
and repayments.
 Lender Characteristics
Both Individual or retail lenders/investors are non-professional individu-
als, that typically fall into one of three categories: (1) certified high net- 
worth or sophisticated investors; (2) ordinary investors who receive 
regulated advice (e.g. from a financial advisor); or (3) ordinary investors 
who self-certify and invest within a regulated prescribed cap (e.g. cap on 
the amount invested by an individual at a defined percentage of wealth or 
income, or a cap on the amount that can be invested in a single loan 
product).
Individual lenders may also be accredited or unaccredited, depending 
upon the jurisdiction. In many countries there are restrictions that allow 
only for accredited individuals to participate in digital lending. 
Accreditation permits individuals to purchase securities that are not reg-
istered with financial authorities or are public.
For example, the CCAF has produced an extensive investor-profiling 
for the UK FinTech credit market (Zhang et al. 2017). The results reveal 
that P2P Lending investors in the United Kingdom tend to be predomi-
nantly males aged over 55, with undergraduate degrees and earning above 
the average (~£26,500) per annum. They also tend to have some experi-
ence in investment or finance. Elsewhere in Europe, Oxera (2015) showed 
that awareness of P2P lending was associated with higher education and 
higher income.
The CCAF’s research into the risk perceptions of United Kingdom 
alternative finance investors (Zhang et al. 2017) found that investors in 
P2P consumer loans see the asset class as similar to managed funds in 
terms of risk profile and should thus expect similar returns. P2P business 
loans, on the other hand, are seen as riskier, and of comparable risk level 
to listed equities. Property P2P is ranked somewhere in between the two.
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 Institutionalization of Investment in Crowdlending
Institutionalization refers to the proportion of volume which can be 
attributed to institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual 
funds, asset management firms and banks in what is otherwise labelled 
as ‘the crowd’. This excludes individual investors, such as accredited or 
unaccredited investors. However, the influx of institutional funding 
from traditional financial institutions, coupled with the increasing 
involvement of high net worth investors, is also blurring and pushing 
the boundaries of original conceptualization of the P2P Lending model.
To a certain degree, the involvement of institutional investors in crowd 
finance may be controversial. There is some evidence that they might 
have historically derived better returns on platforms than those platforms’ 
individual investors (Mohammadi and Shafi 2017). Here, when institu-
tions are able to self-select loan parts on a more granular basis than indi-
viduals, and if they get first pick of the loans on offer, then not only will 
they derive higher returns, but also make it very difficult for individual 
investors’ portfolios to be optimised.
Figure 4.5 presents the share of institutional versus retail investors in 
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Fig. 4.5 Institutional vs. retail investors in crowdlending (globally) in 2018
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of alternative finance volumes, institutional investors also contributed 
significant sums. The sources of institutional funding vary significantly 
between models, although P2P lending models tend to attract investment 
from traditional banks, pension funds, hedge funds and asset manage-
ment firms. Public and governmental funders, such as local authorities, 
also actively lend through such channels. In the United Kingdom, during 
2017 (Zhang et  al. 2018), 40% (£815  million) of the P2P Business 
Lending volume came from institutional investors, a sharp increase from 
28% in 2016. The corresponding figure for P2P Consumer Lending was 
39% (£554 million) in 2017.
According to CCAF Global Report (2020), certain lending models 
lend themselves to greater institutionalization. In 2018, on a global basis, 
models of consumer lending are heavily influenced by institutional 
engagement, with balance sheet activities also having considerable influ-
ence from institutions. Regionally, the United States is heavily driven by 
institutional investors with 85% of funding originating from institu-
tional investors. Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand represent 
regions with lowest proportion of institutional investments, with 17% 
and 12% respectively. In all other regions (Asia Pacific, Canada, Europe, 
Latin America, and the UK), institutional investors account for close to 
50% of funding.
 Matching
For crowdlending models to be successful, the platform must efficiently 
match compatible borrowers and lenders. This may be done manually or 
automatically, based on investor preferences. Retail investors may prefer 
to manually select the loans they invest in, whilst institutional investors 
may establish auto-investment criteria with the platform to reduce trans-
action time and costs. Platforms have an incentive to automate loan 
selection, to simplify the loan selection process and to reduce transac-
tion costs.
Investors have numerous ways of participating in a digital lending 
platform. Early P2P Lending models allowed individuals to select the 
specific loans they wanted to participate in, and, on some platforms, 
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bidding for loan parts in an auction at a price of their choice. However, 
what are commonly referred to as ‘self-select’ and ‘auction’ options are 
becoming increasingly rare. Instead, automated loan selection has become 
popular practice. In such process, lenders selecting ‘investment criteria’, 
which the platform uses to ‘auto-invest’ the lender’s money in loans 
meeting that criteria.
The most common practice in automation is known as ‘Automated 
Lender Diversification’. Such approach implies that the lender is a passive 
investor, being matched against available loan parts/tranches that adhere 
to his or her predetermined preferences in terms of duration, risk appe-
tite, amount, interest rate, etc. The platform will diversify exposure to 
new loans within the loan book that meet the investors pre-set selec-
tions. In this context, an approach growing in popularity, especially in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, is the ‘Managed Portfolio 
Approach’. In this case, lenders may select from two or three ‘managed’ 
lending options, where they are no longer selecting their desired dura-
tion or a specific interest rate. Rather, they will be joining a portfolio 
that offers a range of acceptable return, and the platform diversifies 
lender funds by exposing them across the loan book that fits the lender’s 
‘managed option’ (e.g. Zopa Cor & Zopa Plus). To ensure investors 
receive a consistent product, the platform will continuously move loans 
into and out of their portfolio so that the portfolio as a whole has the 
promised attributes.
Such automated assignment mechanisms are likely to attract increased 
scrutiny from regulators, as they could be construed as constituting 
investment advice, portfolio management, collective investment, or mul-
tilateral trading facilities. This may restrict platforms from offering the 
service or increase licensing requirements.
 Success in Crowdlending
Success in crowdlending is associated with fulfilment of loans, indicat-
ing that target sums for a loan were successfully raised from prospective 
investors. A recent literature review by Shneor and Vik (2020) has iden-
tified nine persistent variables which were associated with successful 
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loan fulfilment across multiple studies. First, with respect to borrowers, 
various signals of risk have been associated with success. Indeed, earlier 
studies show a positive association of credit scores and success (e.g. 
Kuwabara et al. 2017; Pope and Sydnor 2011), a negative association 
between debt to income ratio and success (e.g. Larrimore et al. 2011; 
Pope and Sydnor 2011), and positive association between previous suc-
cessful loan raising and success in later loan raising (e.g. Barasinska and 
Schäfer 2014; Chen et al. 2017). In addition, studies suggest that female 
borrowers are more successful than men (e.g. Chen et al. 2017; Pope and 
Sydnor 2011), and this has sometimes been related to asking relatively 
smaller loans.
Second, certain loan terms were associated with greater success. 
Unsurprisingly, studies show that successful loans were associated with 
lower sums (e.g. Kuwabara et al. 2017; Yum et al. 2012), shorter time- 
horizons (e.g. Galak et al. 2011; Lee and Lee 2012), and higher interest 
rates (e.g. Feng et al. 2015; Larrimore et al. 2011). Furthermore, success 
was also positively associated with longer stated duration of campaigns 
(e.g. Larrimore et al. 2011; Lee and Lee 2012), and higher levels of on- 
site crowd interactions with borrowers via comments and Q&A (e.g. Lee 
and Lee 2012; Yum et al. 2012).
 Conclusion
Crowdlending emerged as the leading model of crowdfunding in both 
scope and scale in every region. It is considered as both a challenge and 
supplement to traditional credit service providers by opening opportuni-
ties for investment and borrowing for wider groups of people. For lend-
ers, it offers new investment opportunities, often involving better returns 
than some alternative investment channels, as well as opening to incorpo-
rate new small-scale investors that have not enjoyed such opportunities 
before. For borrowers, it offers new channels to access credit, often either 
offered at better terms or by including groups that have previously 
been marginalized and underserved by traditional credit service providers.
In the current chapter we present the brief history of crowdlend-
ing, its diversity of models, the current state or the industry, as well as the 
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underlying mechanisms and principles guiding platform operations 
including risk assessment and the matching of borrowers and lenders. 
The discussion is supported by a review of related research, while high-
lighting trajectories of industry development trends.
 Implications for Research
While receiving some attention, opportunities for research into 
crowdlending realities remain abundant. First, while most research 
focuses on P2P consumer lending, more research is needed into the par-
ticularities of business and property lending in the P2P model, as well as 
research examining alternative models to P2P including Balance Sheet 
lending, Invoice Trading, and Debt-based Securities. Here, with respect 
to all models, scholars are encouraged to examine the motivations for 
borrowers to use such channels vs. traditional ones, as well as the motiva-
tion of lenders to invest via such channels versus alternative investment 
channels. Furthermore, enhancing our knowledge about drivers of suc-
cess in filling loans outside of the P2P consumer lending context may be 
valuable for would be borrowers and platforms that use such models. 
Alternatively, new research into success drivers in the P2P consumer 
lending space may also be conducted but should cover new national and 
cultural contexts beyond the United States and China, which represent 
most studies published thus far.
Second, of special importance are studies that may examine the impact 
of crowdlending in broad terms examining to which extent has it deliv-
ered on its promises. Here, studies should explore whether indeed access 
to credit has been improved in various contexts and social groups. 
Moreover, studies should examine whether crowdlending is used as a 
supplement or as an alternative to traditional credit services, and whether 
the conditions offered for such loans are indeed better than those 
offered elsewhere. Finally, in this context, future research may also exam-
ine the impact of crowdlending on indebtedness of individuals 
and organizations in different socio-economic contexts, studying 
whether debt burdens have increased, decreased, or remained 
unchanged following the use of crowdlending.
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 Implications for Practice
Practical implications are evident with respect to borrowers, lenders, 
platforms, and regulators. First, individuals and organizations interested 
in borrowing should examine and educate themselves about opportuni-
ties being provided by crowdlending platforms, while comparing them to 
other channels of credit. Once they decide to use such services, in order 
to improve their chances of receiving the loan, they should provide reli-
able information that may reduce the risk associated with their loan 
requests. At the same time, research suggested that they should aim for 
shorter term loans and be actively engaged with prospective lenders via 
social and platform communication tools.
Second, in terms of lenders, would be investors should educate them-
selves about the services offered by various crowdlending platforms, the 
different investment products available, and the risks associated with 
them. While research shows that platform risk assessments and ratings 
are good predictors of loan default, investors should examine a variety of 
risk indicators that can better inform their decision. Furthermore, in 
jurisdictions where automatic assignment of loans is allowed by law, 
investors should consider using such options for diversification and risk 
spreading across a portfolio of loans that match their preferences.
Third, platforms should engage in continuous learning about service 
developments in the industry with focus on process automation and 
streamlining, as well as the adoption of advanced machine learning in 
risk assessment and default prediction. This would enhance crowdlend-
ing FinTech platforms to fully tap into the cost efficiencies their mode of 
operations was set to achieve. Furthermore, despite temptation to 
onboard as many loans as possible, platforms should be wary of risky 
loans that may tarnish their reputation among prospective investors, as 
well as trigger regulatory crackdown that may limit industry develop-
ment beyond the required risk management.
Finally, regulators should follow the industry and engage in active 
dialogue with its players towards developing regulatory frameworks that 
balance investor and borrower protection and industry growth, or 
support increase of access to credit while ensuring responsible use of it. 
Furthermore, public authorities should be concerned with informing 
the public about both the opportunities and risks associated with 
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crowdlending engagements through encouraging and/or requiring 
training for individuals and organizations that use such services to a 
greater scale and frequency than others.
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